History of Greece, Volume 07 (of 12)

In Short

This seventh volume of George Grote’s history covers a critical inflection point in ancient Greek history, beginning with the flawed Peace of Nikias in 421 B.C. and culminating in the total destruction of the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 413 B.C., along with its immediate aftermath. Grote traces how political vanity, factional instability, and strategic miscalculations shattered Athens’s empire. Through detailed narrative and rigorous analysis of ancient sources, the work details the fragile alliances of the Peloponnese, the notorious destruction of Melos, and the hubristic Sicilian campaign. The volume has endured because Grote writes not merely as a chronicler of battles, but as a defender of democratic institutions, dissecting how civic paranoia and selfish leadership can undermine even the most formidable republic.

The Story

The volume opens in the uneasy aftermath of the battle of Amphipolis with the conclusion of the Peace of Nikias. Sparta, desperate to recover high-born citizens captured by Athens, agrees to terms that leave its chief allies—Thebes, Corinth, Megara, and Elis—profoundly dissatisfied. Rather than securing a lasting tranquility, the treaty triggers a chaotic realigning of Greek politics. Sparta’s allies seek new leadership under democratic Argos, while inside Athens, the cautious policy of Nikias is challenged by the brilliant, ambitious young aristocrat Alkibiadês. Seeking personal prestige and stung by Spartan disdain, Alkibiadês manipulates Athenian politics to build an anti-Spartan coalition in the Peloponnese. Though Sparta eventually reasserts its military dominance at the battle of Mantineia, the peace remains a fiction, marked by proxy conflicts, oligarchical coups, and mounting hostility.

Athens’s imperial policy turns increasingly ruthless, reaching a dark climax in the unprovoked invasion and subjugation of the neutral island of Melos. The Athenians execute the adult male population and enslave the women and children, an act driven by imperial pride that earns Athens widespread hatred throughout the Greek world. Yet this exercise of force is merely a prelude to a far grander and more ruinous ambition: the conquest of Sicily. Enticed by exaggerated promises of wealth from the Sicilian city of Egesta, the Athenian assembly votes to send a colossal fleet to the west, placing command jointly in the hands of the hesitant Nikias and the reckless Alkibiadês.

On the eve of the fleet's departure, a sensational act of sacrilege shocks Athens: the sacred Hermæ statues throughout the city are mutilated in a single night. Terror and religious panic grip the public, who suspect an oligarchical conspiracy to overthrow the democracy. Alkibiadês is implicated alongside other prominent figures. Though allowed to depart with the fleet, he is soon recalled to stand trial. Fleeing into exile instead, Alkibiadês defected to Sparta, where he offers his former enemies devastatingly accurate strategic advice: send a competent Spartan general to lead the defence of Syracuse, and fortify Dekeleia in Attica to paralyze Athens at home.

In Sicily, the Athenian forces under Nikias establish a siege around Syracuse, constructing lines of circumvallation that bring the city to the brink of surrender. The arrival of the energetic Spartan commander Gylippus turns the tide. Gylippus revitalizes Syracusan morale, builds counter-walls to block the siege, and gradually drives the Athenians onto the defensive. Even after Athens sends a massive relief expedition under Demosthenês, a disastrous night attack on the heights of Epipolæ shatters Athenian hopes.

Demosthenês urges an immediate naval retreat, but Nikias hesitates, paralyzed by fear of facing an angry Athenian assembly and misled by false promises of internal Syracusan betrayal. When a lunar eclipse further delays their departure out of religious superstition, the Syracusans block the entrance to the Great Harbor. In a desperate naval battle, the Athenian fleet is crushed. The retreat on land becomes a horrific march of destruction; both Demosthenês and Nikias are forced to surrender, and their men are subjected to brutal captivity in the stone quarries of Syracuse, where most perish. The volume closes as a weakened, grieving Athens faces the revolt of its subject-allies, sponsored by Persian gold and Spartan fleets, fighting for its sheer survival.

How It Unfolds

A flawed peace takes hold Sparta and Athens sign a treaty to end hostilities, but Sparta’s major allies reject the terms while Athens recklessly restores Spartan captives without securing promised territorial returns. Nikias mismanages the negotiation, leaving Athens without the leverage it sacrificed so much to attain.

New alliances split the Peloponnese Oligarchical maneuverings in Bœotia and Argos create a volatile diplomatic landscape. Alkibiadês takes advantage of Spartan slights to orchestrate an anti-Spartan alliance with Argos, drawing Athens back into proxy warfare.

The destruction of Melos Athens attacks the neutral island of Melos out of pure imperial pride rather than strategic necessity. The city is reduced, its men slaughtered, and its women and children enslaved, shocking Greek moral sentiment.

The grand ambition for Sicily Lured by Egestan promises and driven by passion rather than foresight, Athens votes to send an immense fleet to conquer Sicily. Nikias tries to dissuade the assembly, but his warnings only prompt the public to double the expedition’s size.

Terror and sacrilege in Athens On the eve of sail, the widespread nocturnal mutilation of the Hermæ statues strikes panic into the Athenian public, who fear an oligarchical plot. Investigations lead to mass arrests, public hysteria, and the eventual recall and defecting of Alkibiadês.

The siege of Syracuse turns Athenian forces nearly complete a wall encircling Syracuse, but the arrival of the Spartan officer Gylippus reverses their momentum. Gylippus builds counter-works and rallies Sicilian allies, trapping the besiegers in their own camp.

Catastrophe in the Great Harbor Despite reinforcements under Demosthenês, Athenian counter-attacks fail, and superstition delays their retreat after a lunar eclipse. The Syracusans trap and destroy the Athenian fleet inside the harbor, forcing a grim retreat by land.

Surrender and total ruin The retreating Athenian columns are cut to pieces or captured by Syracusan cavalry, with Nikias and Demosthenês surrendering unconditionally. The expedition ends in total annihilation, leaving Athens exposed to Persian-backed Spartan offensives.

The People

Nikias An aristocratic Athenian general and statesman who desires peace, caution, and the preservation of Athenian wealth. His philo-Laconian leanings lead him to give away vital diplomatic leverage, and his profound indecisiveness and superstitious fear of public dishonor ultimately paralyze his army in Sicily, leading his entire command to destruction.

Alkibiadês A brilliant, flamboyant, and deeply selfish Athenian leader driven by a insatiable thirst for admiration and personal glory. When Spartan elders rebuff his youthful advances, he abruptly flips his political stance to aggressively oppose Sparta, masterminds the Sicilian expedition for personal advancement, and ultimately betrays Athens to Sparta when indicted for sacrilege.

Gylippus A disciplined Spartan commander sent to direct the defense of Syracuse. Possessing high military capability and tactical resolve, he transforms a panicked Syracusan population into an aggressive fighting force, methodically outmaneuvering Nikias and turning a siege into a total triumph.

Demosthenês A skilled and pragmatic Athenian general sent with reinforcements to rescue the Sicilian campaign. Recognizing the futility of remaining after a failed attack on Epipolæ, he advocates for an immediate retreat, but is stymied by Nikias until it is far too late to escape.

Hermokratês A prominent Syracusan statesman and strategist who advocates for Sicilian unity against Athenian aggression. He uses clever stratagems—including deceptive messages sent to Nikias—to delay the Athenian retreat long enough for Syracusan forces to block the roads.

In Its Own Voice

"Most certainly there was never any public recommendation of Kleon, as far as our information goes, so ruinously impolitic as this alliance with Sparta and surrender of the captives, wherein both Nikias and Alkibiadês concurred."

Grote offers a sharp re-evaluation of Athenian leadership, arguing that the aristocratic peace party committed far worse strategic blunders than the populist demagogues they criticized.

"To the Athenians, when they went forth on the following morning, each man seeing the divine guardian at his doorway dishonored and defaced... it would seem that the town had become as it were godless."

The author captures the profound psychological and religious panic that gripped Athens following the mutilation of the Hermæ statues right before the Sicilian fleet set sail.

"Never in Grecian history had a force so large, so costly, so efficient, and so full of promise and confidence, been turned out; never in Grecian history had ruin so complete and sweeping, or victory so glorious and unexpected, been witnessed."

This passage summarizes the dramatic weight of the Sicilian disaster, emphasizing the unprecedented scale of the loss for Athens and its transformative effect on the Greek world.

What It's Really About

Beneath its detailed narrative of troop movements, siege works, and diplomatic envoys, this volume is an interrogation of democratic governance and imperial ambition. Grote examines how free political institutions handle success, crisis, and fear. The text illustrates how a democracy can be misled by charismatic self-interest like that of Alkibiadês or paralyzed by the conventional, risk-averse timidities of Nikias.

It is also an analysis of the moral decay that accompanies unchecked power. In the destruction of Melos, Grote demonstrates how an empire driven by the "passion for new acquisition" loses its moral compass and strategic restraint, substituting brute force for prudence. The tragedy of the Sicilian expedition serves as a case study in how hubris, public hysteria, and religious anxiety can combine to blind a state to obvious dangers, leading a great power to engineer its own destruction through sheer misjudgment and factional strife.

Why Read It Today

George Grote’s history remains one of the foundational works of modern classical scholarship, notable for its passionate defence of Athenian democracy against the dismissive treatments of earlier aristocratic historians. Reading this volume provides a front-row seat to one of the greatest political and military dramas in human history. Grote writes with clear, authoritative prose that bridges academic rigor and narrative momentum, bringing ancient debates and military maneuvers to vivid life.

The volume does present certain difficulties for the modern reader. Grote writes in an unhurried nineteenth-century style, incorporating extensive Greek footnotes, dense textual criticism, and archaic spellings (such as "Alkibiadês" or "Bœotians"). He expects the reader to follow complex parliamentary maneuvers, intricate geographic descriptions of siege lines, and multi-party diplomatic treaties across Peloponnesian city-states.

Yet these obstacles are well worth navigating. Grote’s portrayal of how fear and political polarization can erode rational debate feels startlingly modern. What stays with the reader is the tragic momentum of the Sicilian campaign: the terrifying slide from overconfident arrogance to helpless entrapment in the marshes of Syracuse. For anyone interested in statecraft, military history, or the fragile nature of democratic societies, Grote’s seventh volume offers a masterclass in historical prose and timeless political analysis.